Native and foreign-born workers with a high school degree or less educational attainment provide unique occupational skills to the US labor force. This regularity might be driven, in part, by limited access to occupations for immigrants lacking legal rights to work in the US. This paper exploits exogenous policy change induced by the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) to perform triple-difference estimation examining whether legal status causes immigrants to work in occupations that use skills more similar to those of native-born workers. We find that legal status decreases the manual skill 
I. Introduction
The economics literature provides extensive evidence that foreign and native-born workers with a high school degree or less education are imperfect substitutes in production.
1 This distinction is of primary importance to long-standing political and economic debate in the United States. If immigrants and natives are perfectly substitutable, then immigration will reduce wages paid to similar natives. If they are not, then natives will be protected from direct competition with immigrants and could experience complementarities and wage increases.
Much of the evidence for imperfect substitutability arises because immigrants and natives work in different types of occupations: Among workers with little educational attainment, native-born workers tend to specialize in occupations requiring communication skills, whereas immigrants perform manual labor. 2 An open question, however, is whether some of the difference in immigrant presence across occupations is driven by accessibility. Employer willingness to hire immigrants residing in the US illegally might vary across occupations due to licensing requirements, heterogeneity in the likelihood that employment laws will be enforced, or related reasons.
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The legal status of immigrants might therefore play a role in determining the type of work performed and skills used by immigrant workers. Unfortunately, information on legal status is not available in widely-used nationally representative surveys such as the US Census, American Community Survey (ACS), or Current Population Survey (CPS). As one solution to this limitation, some studies have relied on the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) as a source of information. IRCA was passed in 1986 ostensibly to reduce the inflow of illegal immigration into the United States by introducing employer penalties for hiring undocumented workers and increasing border enforcement. However, it also offered amnesty that granted legal status to previously unauthorized immigrants who could verify continuous residency in the US since January 1, 1982. Exogenous policy change created by IRCA allows us to identify groups of workers likely to have acquired legal status. This facilitates triple-difference estimation to examine how legalization affects legalized immigrant wages and occupational skills.
Our analysis begins by exploring wage effects -a question examined by previous studies as well. We find that wage effects appear to exist but are small. Mexican-born immigrants who were likely eligible for amnesty through IRCA saw wages increase by 2.9-6.5%. The second part of our analysis is more innovative. We examine whether IRCA-induced legal status created an opportunity for immigrants to 1 See Ottaviano and Peri (2012) , Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012) , and Card (2009 Card ( , 2012 
II. Related Literature
Many economists have examined the effect of legal status on immigrant wages and/or occupational standing. Since documentation status is not available in nationally-representative datasets, many authors turn to alternative sources. For example, Lozano and Sorensen (2011) use the Mexican Migration Project (MMP). They note that most undocumented immigrants affected by IRCA were from Mexico and conclude that IRCA was associated with a statistically significant 20-log point increase in
Mexican immigrant earnings. As a placebo test, they perform regressions using groups not expected to be affected by the policy (e.g., native born Hispanics and immigrants not born in Mexico) and find effects that are rarely significant.
Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2011) examine Hispanic natives from the 1979 National Survey of Youth (NLSY79) of similar age and work experience to those in the Legalized Population Suvey (LPS) to estimate the effects of legalization on immigrant labor market outcomes. They find that for both women and men, employment fell, unemployment rose, and wage rates were higher at statistically significant levels for newly legalized immigrants after IRCA. The paper also highlights that legalization can affect labor supply of immigrants in three ways: staying employed and earning higher wages because legalization allows immigrants to negotiate wages and no longer be dependent upon a single employer;
exiting employment in search of a better job match while receiving employment insurance; or entering the work force for the first time (as cited in Killingsworth 1983) .
Although Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2011) find that legalization affects employment outcomes, they find limited direct evidence that it affects returns to skill. They discover that returns to work experience increased for men but were not statistically different from zero for women, and legalization raised the employment returns to English proficiency. Thus, higher-skilled immigrants benefit from legalization and less-skilled foreign-born workers become unemployed because they can now receive unemployment insurance. Kossoudji and Clark (2002) also work with LPS and a comparison sample from NLSY79 to show that English proficiency and education improved wage growth for male immigrants following legalization.
Their results provide strong evidence that amnesty from IRCA enhanced the labor market opportunities of legalized workers. The authors also highlight that changes in wages for legalized men resulted from their new legal status rather than from the macroeconomic conditions, as post-legalization gains resulted primarily from changes in return to human capital. Sisk (2014) studies the difference between scarring associated with previous unauthorized status and the turning point of legalization to determine how amnesty affects hourly wages and occupational standing. He defines a "turning point" as new economic opportunities for immigrants, and "scarring" as receiving no benefit from legalization. He concludes that overall legalization is a turning point for immigrants after finding that wages of legalized immigrant men and women are 25% higher than they would be if they had remained unauthorized. Although he finds that men are more likely than women to benefit, legalization improves occupational standing and upward mobility into jobs with higher median wages. As a caveat, however, he notes that endogeneity could possibly bias his study.
In contrast to the studies above, some work has found little effect from legalization. Lofstrom, Hill and Hayes (2010) find that improvements in employment outcomes from legalization are likely to be small, if not zero. Although they do find slight significant changes in wages for some immigrant groups, they argue that these changes are due to demographic and residential factors rather than legalization.
The authors test the effects of authorization on wages paid to legal immigrants, those who crossed the border illegally, and those who over-stayed their visas. They highlight that visa abusers and illegal border crossers tend to be employed in low-skilled occupations with low earnings, while legal immigrants tend to be employed in high-skilled jobs with higher pay. Similar to Orrenius and Zavodny (2006), Lofstorm, Hill and Hayes (2010) find that high-skilled immigrants will benefit more from legalization than low-skilled immigrants. Their evidence also shows that visa abusers benefit from gaining legal status because the occupational earnings of immigrants in this category increased by approximately 13% more than those of continuously legal immigrants. However, they find that the discrepancies between wages amongst immigrant groups are most likely due to other demographic features and the amount of time an immigrant has been residing in the U.S. rather than the legalization process itself. Thus, legalizing unauthorized immigrants is unlikely to lead to dramatic changes in the labor market outcomes of most previously unauthorized immigrants, especially for low-skilled workers.
Although the authors find that highly skilled immigrants exhibit occupational improvements after gaining legal status, ultimately none of these changes are attributed directly to gaining legal status. One important criticism of this study, however, is that it uses observations from data collected only one year after immigrants were able to receive amnesty, so this may not have given enough time for legalization to significantly affect immigrant wages.
Importantly, other authors have recognized trends common across immigrants within ethnic group regardless of legal status. Donato and Sisk (2012) study how government policy changed the conditions in places Mexican migrants work. They find worsening conditions for both unauthorized and legal
Mexican migrants in the years following IRCA. Similarly, Donato, Durand, and Massey (1992) find that wages for men deteriorated for Mexicans after IRCA. This occurred because the policy's efforts to reduce the number of unauthorized immigrants led to increases in deportations and more raids in workplaces to check documentation. Consequently, risk-averse employers began to treat all Mexican migrant workers the same regardless of their legal status in order to avoid penalties. Thus, employers
were more worried about having the correct paperwork filled out by the Mexican employer rather than what their true documentation status was, and as a result workplace conditions became unfavorable.
Although legal status is likely to generate the most direct and important labor market consequences for immigrants, it might affect outcomes for native-born workers as well. Orrenius and Zavodny (2006) , Ottaviano and Peri (2012) , Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012 ), and Card (2009 , 2012 are among many authors to have noted that the degree of substitution between native and foreign-born workers is a key determinant of the effect of immigration on native wages. Issues of substitutability and the implied wage effect for native-born wage remains unresolved in the economics literature. 4 In additional to other papers cited in the text, see Altonji and Card (1991) , Butcher and Card (1991) , LaLonde and Topel (1991) or Schoeni (1997) for evidence that immigration has little or zero significant negative effect on native wages. Card (2012) argues that overall impact of legalization on native wages is far smaller than the effects of other factors like new technology, institutional changes, and macroeconomic conditions. See Borjas (2003 Borjas ( , 2013 for contrary evidence that immigration lowers the wage of the average native worker by 3.2%, 8.9% for high school One source of potential imperfect substitutability lies in the occupations and their associated skills performed by native and foreign-born labor. Peri and Sparber (2009) allows immigrant workers to access jobs and perform skills more similar to those of native-born workers, it will increase labor market competition, which could potentially generate larger negative wage effects.
III. Empirical Framework and Data

Model Intuition
IRCA legislation in 1986 granted amnesty to illegal immigrants who could verify continuous residency in the U.S. since January 1, 1982. This policy change therefore provides a natural experiment for identifying the effects of legal status on immigrant workers. This paper estimates the effects of acquiring legal status on the wage and occupational skill outcomes of foreign-born workers in the United
States. To do so, we follow insights outlined in Ball, Dube, and Sorensen (2010) and perform tripledifference estimation across individuals (i) similar to regression (1): Finally, TYear is a dichotomous variable identifying the year of the data survey. This too will be discussed in further detail in the following section. The key insight is that amnesty was a one-time event,
and that established immigrants in the treated group will not experience the same labor market effects in every survey year.
Altogether, the model implies that the triple-difference coefficient (η) is the key parameter of interest. This coefficient measures whether the treated group of established immigrants who were likely to have received amnesty experienced wage or skill changes as a result of IRCA legislation.
Census Data
We use 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census data to estimate the regression model in (1 Our resulting sample of foreign-born workers with a high school degree or less education is dominated by individuals born in Latin America. 42% of respondents were born in Mexico, and another 28% were born in other Latin American countries. The remaining countries with the highest levels of representation are Vietnam (5%), China (3%), and the Philippines (3%). Placebo checks later in the paper will focus on immigrants from these countries.
Given the data availability, we re-express our main regression model as equation (2):
The with immigrants from other source countries. Another will compare workers with college experience. In those cases, both the "treatment" and "control" groups are assumed to be in the US legally, and should not be subject to IRCA legislation. If our estimation strategy is valid, the triple difference coefficient in these placebo exercises should be insignificantly different from zero.
Skill Data
Wage effects provide a direct and obvious channel through which legal status could affect the labor market outcomes of foreign-born workers. However, changes in occupational skill composition might have broader effects on native-born workers by implying more intense labor market competition for jobs in which native workers have a comparative advantage.
We follow Peri and Sparber's (2009) We do not examine the broader impacts of legal status on American workers in this paper. Instead, our empirical analysis will assess whether legal status causes the occupational skills of immigrants to look more like those of natives. These results will be indicative of whether legal status increases the risk of potential labor market competition. The values displayed in Figure 1 are useful for providing context for regression estimates. Column (1) uses Mexicans as the treatment group and compares wage outcomes to (non-Mexican) Latin
IV. Empirical Results
Wage Results
Americans. The triple interaction-term is created to identify immigrants that most likely were affected by the amnesty program (Mexicans who likely changed from being in the US illegally pre-IRCA to legally post-IRCA). The coefficient indicates that the acquisition of legal status through IRCA legislation increased wages paid to likely illegal immigrants by 6.5%.
Beyond our main estimates, the model includes a host of control variables that produce predictable signs. High school dropouts earn 15.1% lower wages than high school graduates. Female migrants earn 22.8% less than men. Migrants in the country 9-10 years earn 3.7% more than those in the country 6-8 years. Mexicans earn 2.6% less than other immigrants. Unreported regression coefficients reveal an earnings profile that generally increases with age at a diminishing rate. Individuals who work more hours and weeks per year earn higher wages. Simple difference-in-difference estimation comparing wage effects of Mexicans to other immigrants will be biased if they fail to account for eligibility based upon year of arrival to the US.
Column (2) compares outcomes of Mexicans to other (non-Latin American) immigrants. This is an important exercise because if many Latin Americans also received legal status through IRCA legislation, then Column (1) would underestimate the wage effects. It is therefore somewhat surprising that the magnitude of the wage coefficient decreases to 2.9% and is insignificant at conventional levels (p-value of 0.122). Nonetheless, we still believe that this result provides mildly supportive evidence for wage increases associated with the acquisition of legal status.
Column (3) performs our first placebo test. Vietnam, China, and the Philippines are the three largest non-Latin American source countries in our sample and account for roughly 11% of foreign-born workers with a high school degree or less education. Unlike with Mexicans (or potentially other Latin American groups), the literature assumes that the vast majority of workers from these countries reside in the US legally. Thus, we should not expect IRCA to provide legal status or generate any wage differential for immigrants from these countries relative to those from other sources. Indeed, the triple difference coefficient in Column (3) reduces to just 1.6% and is far from being statistically significant (p-value of 0.614). We believe this exercise helps to demonstrate that the estimated coefficients in Column (1) and -to a lesser extent -in Column (2) are due to the acquisition of legal status and not due to omitted factors correlated with IRCA's policy change.
The comparison between Vietnamese, Chinese, and Pilipino immigrants to other groups is not the only potential placebo check. The economics literature often notes that immigrants illegally residing in the US have reduced access to higher education 8 and jobs associated with a college degree. 9 We might therefore expect IRCA legislation to have little impact on wage differentials paid to college-educated Mexicans versus other workers. Table 2 explores this possibility by reporting regressions performed across individuals with at least some college experience. Columns repeat the structure of Table 1 . All three regressions report tripledifference coefficients that are insignificant from zero, again helping to confirm that the result in Table 1 was driven by legal status and not a related but omitted variable. However, the coefficient estimates in
Columns (1) and (2) are somewhat troublesome, as they are quite close to the figures estimated in Table   1 . The number of Mexicans and Latin Americans in the college sample is much smaller than in the low education sample, which could affect the precision of the estimates. The number of immigrants from other source countries grows, however. In Column (3), we see a point estimate of the effect of IRCA effectively equal to zero when comparing Vietnamese, Chinese, and Pilipino outcomes to other collegeeducated immigrants.
Altogether, we believe the regressions and placebo checks in Tables 1 and 2 offer mildly supportive evidence to past work provided by Sorensen (2011), Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2011) , Kossoudji and Clark (2002) , and others. Legal status increases wages paid to foreign-born workers with little educational attainment by 2.9-6.5%. The estimates are identified by IRCA legislation and do not appear to be the result of omitted variables bias.
Skill Results
8 See Kaushal (2008) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Sparber (2014) . 9 See Orrenius and Zavodny (2006) .
The manual and communication skills discussed in Table 3 represent an aggregation of several component skills identified by O*NET. Table 4 Table 3 .
Both parings find support for several skill responses consistent with the interpretation that legal status caused immigrants to work in occupations more similar to those held by native-born workers.
Columns (1) and (2) Altogether, the results of Table 4 provide evidence that Mexicans did respond to IRCA legislation by increasing communication-related skills and decreasing manual-related skills. These responses were small, however, suggesting that the implied increase in labor market competition with native-born workers was small as well.
V. Conclusion
Immigration continues to be a major political and economic issue, so it is important to understand how policy affects the U.S. labor market. Legal status for undocumented immigrants could have many effects. Most directly, it could provide immigrants with job opportunities offering higher wages.
However, these jobs might involve skills more similar to those used by native-born workers. Unit of observation is a foreign-born individual. In addition to coefficients shown, the model includes indicators for age, weeks worked per year, hours worked per week, and a constant. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note: Unit of observation is a foreign-born individual with a high school degree or less education. In addition to coefficients shown, the model includes a control for the employment rate of a migrant's cohort; indicators for gender, being a high school dropout, age, weeks worked per year, hours worked per week, and a constant. The model includes a full array of controls for the treated group, treated period, being an established immigrant, and all two-way interactions. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note: Unit of observation is a foreign-born individual with a high school degree or less education. In addition to coefficients shown, the model includes a control for the employment rate of a migrant's cohort; indicators for gender, being a high school dropout, age, weeks worked per year, hours worked per week, and a constant. The model includes a full array of controls for the treated group, treated period, being an established immigrant, and all two-way interactions. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1: Average Occupational Skills among Workers with a High School Degree or Less Education
Note: Values represent the proportion of the US workforce using less than a given skill. 
